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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WALTER W. SPRAGUE and UNITED 
STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Respondents, 
v. 
BOYLES BROS. DRILLING COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
8351 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
COMES NOW, Boyles Bros. Drilling Company, Appel-
lant, and respectfully petitions this honorable court for a 
rehearing and re-argument in the above entitled case. This 
petition is based upon the following grounds : 
POINT I. 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT 
IS FOUNDED UPON A MISTAKEN ASSUMP-
TION AS TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
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2 
POINT II. 
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE APPE~ 
LANT'S COUNTERCLAIM AND THE UNCON-
TRADICTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF IT. 
POINT III. 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT 
DOES NOT CONSIDER RESPONDENT'S FAIL-
URE TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE 
CONTRACT FROM SEPTEMBER 21, TO OC-
TOBER 5, 1950. 
WHERE F 0 R E, petitioner prays that the judg-
ment and opinion of the court be re-examined and a re-
argument permitted of the entitled case. 
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
and Petitioner. 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, hereby certifies that he is one 
of the attorneys for the petitioner, and that in his opinion 
there is good cause to believe that the judgment objected to 
is erroneous, and that the case ought to be re-examined and 
re-argued as prayed for in aid petition. 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT 
IS FOUNDED UPON A MISTAKEN ASSUMP-
TION AS TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
For the purpose of this petition and brief, we accept 
the conclusion of the majority opinion that the memoran-
dum decision may be considered as supplementing the find-
ings of fact. 
The majority opinion, however, entirely overlooks the 
finding in the memorandum decision that the cost to 
Sprague of breaking the additional rock required was less 
than Sprague agreed to pay Boyles. We quote from the 
memorandum decision: 
"The evidence reveals the breaking of rock by 
Sprague after Boyles quit, cost 45.5 cents per ton 
for the 5,485 tons broken by him, or $4,495.55 which 
shows a cost incurred by Sprague which, had it been 
done under the contract with Boyles would be 
$4,632.80, a saving to Sprague of $137.54" (R. 22). 
Not only does the majority opinion ignore this finding, 
but assumes that a finding in direct conflict thereto was 
made. 
The major item of damage which Sprague sought to 
recover was the cost to him of breaking rock after Boyles 
left the quarry on October 5, 1950. It is elementary that 
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Sprague was not, in any event, entitled to recover the cost 
of breaking rock after Boyles left the quarry, unless such 
cost exceeded what he agreed to pay Boyles under the con-
tract. This is especially true in view of the provisions of 
the contract to the effect that if Boyles did not break the 
rock in time, Sprague could hire such men and equipment 
as was necessary to get the work done on time, and charge 
the same to Boyles. The majority opinion recognizes this 
principle of law. 
The finding in the memorandum decision that the con-
tract price was more than it cost Sprague to break the addi-
tional rock is fully supported by the evidence. It is reason-
able in view of the fact that the price fixed by Boyles un-
doubtedly was intended to produce a profit. 
The majority opinion states: 
"From the trial judge's memorandum opinion 
it appears that he specifically based his award on 
the amount Sprague had to expend on rock over and 
above the 48 cents per ton he would have had to pay 
Boyles under the contract." 
We respectfully submit that there is nothing whatever in 
the memorandum opinion which justifies this conclusion. 
On the contrarY., the finding above quoted to the effect that 
it cost Sprague only forty-five cents a ton to break the ad-
ditional rock stands unmodified and unqualified by a single 
word. 
Nor is there anything in the findings of fact which 
contradicts or modifies this finding. Under these circum-
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5 
stances the finding is binding upon this court and requires 
that the principal award of damages against Boyles be set 
aside. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE APPE~ 
LANT'S COUNTERCLAIM AND THE UNCON-
TRADICTED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF IT. 
The trial court found that Boyles broke 9, 799 tons of 
rock into the sizes specified by the contract, for which it 
was entitled to recover the sum of $4, 703.52, the contract 
price of forty-eight cents per ton. Admittedly, only 
$4,392.00 of this amount was paid, leaving a balance of 
$311.52 due Boyles. It is further admitted that Sprague 
sold to Mathews 1,000 tons of rock that had been broken 
by Boyles. Sprague received $1,000.00 for this rock, and 
was willing that Boyles should receive this amount. Boyles 
was therefore entitled to $1,311.52, plus a reasonable attor-
ney's fee. Even allowing Sprague to change his mind about 
awarding Boyles the $1,000.00 for the rock which Sprague 
sold for that amount, he still was bound under the contract 
to pay at least forty-eight cents per ton for it. In any event, 
Boyles was entitled to recover $792.00, with interest, and 
also a reasonable attorney's fee. 
POINT III. 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT 
DOES NOT CONSIDER RESPONDENT'S FAIL-
URE TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE 
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CONTRACT FROM SEPTEMBER 21, TO OC-
TOBER 5, 1950. 
·The contract upon which this suit is based requires 
Sprague to furnish "sufficient compressed air to efficiently 
operate Boyles Drills." 
The majority opinion underestimates the importance 
of this covenant, and overlooks the uncontradicted evidence 
which discloses a complete and total breach of it following 
the breakdown of the large compressor on September 21. 
It was utterly impossible for Boyles to break rock into 
any size without compressed air. It is not an exaggeration 
to say that the furnishing of compressed air was the most 
vital element of the contract. Not only was the rental cost 
of an air compressor a very substantial item ( $400 to $800 
per month), but it was extremely difficult to get a suitable 
machine in the vicinity of the quarry. Sprague's superin-
tendent contacted "every equipment house and contractor 
or anybody who I thought might have a compressor or know 
of a compressor through the State and two surrounding 
states, trying to locate a compressor and I sat on the phone 
for hours and hours calling" (R. 412). It is inconceivable 
that Boyles would have undertaken to break this rock out 
of the wall of the canyon into the chips specified by the 
contract for the sum of forty-eight cents per ton had it not 
obtained the covenant of Sprague to furnish compressed 
air. 
Even if we forgive Sprague's breach of covenant to 
furnish compressed air prior to September 21, we still have 
the undisputed fact that there was a total breach of this 
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covenant between September 21, when the Bergraph com-
pressor broke down beyond repair, and October 5, when 
Boyles finally left the quarry. It was following this break-
down that Sprague's superintendent made the frantic ef-
forts above quoted to replace the Bergraph compressor. 
How can it be said in the face of these uncontroverted 
facts, that Boyles was not legally justified in abandoning 
the work on October 5? Should it have kept its men and 
equipment idle in the quarry for two years instead of two 
weeks while Sprague's superintendent was contacting the 
equipment houses in the remaining forty-five states of the 
Union? 
Sprague's superintendent realized the significance of 
Sprague's covenant to furnish compressed air, even though 
the majority of this court does not. Immediately after the 
Bergraph compressor broke down he was "aware of the 
fact that we must have a compressor" (R. 414). He had the 
Bergraph compressor returned to its owner with the re-
quest that "they repair it immediately" (R. 411). Since it 
was beyond repair he scoured the western states to find a 
replacement. He was not successful. Meanwhile, Boyles 
stood by with its men and equipment for more than two 
weeks ready, able and willing to complete its terms of the 
contract. 
That the majority of the court has overlooked the total 
breach of the covenant to furnish compressed air after the 
Bergraph compressor broke down on September 21, and the 
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legal consequences of such breach is indicated by the follow-
ing portion of the opinion : 
"* * * there was testimony that a substan-
tial portion of the longest period of deficiency com-
plained of, that is, between December 20, 1949, and 
February 3, 1950, occurred before the contract was 
formally executed by the parties late in January. 
This indicates that this so-called failure was not of 
any grave concern to the Boyles. They having signed 
the contract thereafter, the trial court could reason-
ably believe that they had waived any such failure 
and were in no position to complain of it." 
Of course, Boyles, could not rely upon Sprague's failure 
to furnish compressed air between December 20, 1949, and 
February 3, 1950, as a justification for its failure to break 
the required amount of rock, because it resumed the break-
ing of rock after the surety company came to Sprague's 
rescue. Boyles has never contended that Sprague's breach 
of the contract during that period justified it in abandon-
ing the work on October 5. What it does contend is that 
Sprague's failure to furnish compressed air after Septem-
ber 21, justified it in quitting the job on October 5. 
We respectfully submit that a rehearing of this cause 
should be granted to the end that a serious error of law may 
be corrected. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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